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IMITATION DYNAMICS WITH PAYOFF SHOCKS
PANAYOTIS MERTIKOPOULOS AND YANNICK VIOSSAT
Abstract. We investigate the impact of payoff shocks on the evolution of
large populations of myopic players that employ simple strategy revision pro-
tocols such as the “imitation of success”. In the noiseless case, this process is
governed by the standard (deterministic) replicator dynamics; in the presence
of noise however, the induced stochastic dynamics are different from previous
versions of the stochastic replicator dynamics (such as the aggregate-shocks
model of Fudenberg and Harris, 1992). In this context, we show that strict
equilibria are always stochastically asymptotically stable, irrespective of the
magnitude of the shocks; on the other hand, in the high-noise regime, non-
equilibrium states may also become stochastically asymptotically stable and
dominated strategies may survive in perpetuity (they become extinct if the
noise is low). Such behavior is eliminated if players are less myopic and revise
their strategies based on their cumulative payoffs. In this case, we obtain a sec-
ond order stochastic dynamical system whose attracting states coincide with
the game’s strict equilibria and where dominated strategies become extinct
(a.s.), no matter the noise level.
1. Introduction
Evolutionary game dynamics study the evolution of behavior in populations of
boundedly rational agents that interact strategically. The most widely studied dy-
namical model in this context is the replicator dynamics: introduced in biology as a
model of natural selection (Taylor and Jonker, 1978), the replicator dynamics also
arise from models of imitation of successful individuals (Björnerstedt and Weibull,
1996; Schlag, 1998; Weibull, 1995) and from models of learning in games (Hofbauer
et al., 2009; Mertikopoulos and Moustakas, 2010; Rustichini, 1999). Mathemati-
cally, they stipulate that the growth rate of the frequency of a strategy is propor-
tional to the difference between the payoff of individuals playing this strategy and
the mean payoff in the population. These payoffs are usually assumed deterministic:
this is typically motivated by a large population assumption and the premise that,
owing to the law of large numbers, the resulting mean field provides a good ap-
proximation of a more realistic but less tractable stochastic model. This approach
makes sense when the stochasticity affecting payoffs is independent across individ-
uals playing the same strategies, but it fails when the payoff shocks are aggregate,
that is, when they affect all individuals playing a given strategy in a similar way.
Such aggregate shocks are not uncommon. Bergstrom (2014) recounts the story
of squirrels stocking nuts for the winter months: squirrels may stock a few or a
lot of nuts, the latter leading to a higher probability of surviving a long winter
but a higher exposure to predation. The unpredictable mildness or harshness of
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the ensuing winter will then favor one of these strategies in an aggregate way (see
also Robson and Samuelson, 2011, Sec. 3.1.1, and references therein). In traffic
engineering, one might think of a choice of itinerary to go to work: fluctuations of
traffic on some roads affect all those who chose them in a similar way. Likewise, in
data networks, a major challenge occurs when trying to minimize network latencies
in the presence of stochastic disturbances: in this setting, the travel time of a
packet in the network does not depend only on the load of each link it traverses,
but also on unpredictable factors such as random packet drops and retransmissions,
fluctuations in link quality, excessive backlog queues, etc. (Bertsekas and Gallager,
1992).
Incorporating such aggregate payoff shocks in the biological derivation of the
replicator dynamics leads to the stochastic replicator dynamics of Fudenberg and
Harris (1992), later studied by (among others) Cabrales (2000), Imhof (2005) and
Hofbauer and Imhof (2009). To study the long-run behavior of these dynamics,
Imhof (2005) introduced a modified game where the expected payoff of a strategy
is penalized by a term which increases with the variance of the noise affecting this
strategy’s payoff (see also Hofbauer and Imhof, 2009). Among other results, it
was then shown that a) strategies that are iteratively (strictly) dominated in this
modified game become extinct almost surely; and b) strict equilibria of the modified
game are stochastically asymptotically stable.
In this biological model, noise is detrimental to the long-term survival of strate-
gies: a strategy which is strictly dominant on average (i.e. in the original, un-
modified game) but which is affected by shocks of substantially higher intensity
becomes extinct almost surely. By contrast, in the learning derivation of the repli-
cator dynamics, noise leads to a stochastic exponential learning model where only
iteratively undominated strategies survive, irrespective of the intensity of the noise
(Mertikopoulos and Moustakas, 2010); as a result the frequency of a strictly domi-
nant strategy converges to 1 almost surely. Moreover, strict Nash equilibria of the
original game remain stochastically asymptotically stable (again, independently of
the level of the noise), so the impact of the noise in the stochastic replicator dynam-
ics of exponential learning is minimal when compared to the stochastic replicator
dynamics with aggregate shocks.
In this paper, we study the effect of payoff shocks when the replicator equation
is seen as a model of imitation of successful agents. As in the case of Imhof (2005)
and Hofbauer and Imhof (2009), it is convenient to introduce a noise-adjusted game
which is reduced to the original game in the noiseless, deterministic regime. We
show that: a) strategies that are iteratively strictly dominated in the modified
game become extinct almost surely; and b) strict equilibria of the modified game
are stochastically asymptotically stable. However, despite the formal similarity,
our results are qualitatively different from those of Imhof (2005) and Hofbauer and
Imhof (2009): in the modified game induced by imitation of success in the presence
of noise, noise is not detrimental per se. In fact, in the absence of differences in
expected payoffs, a strategy survives with a probability that does not depend on the
random variance of its payoffs: a strategy’s survival probability is simply its initial
frequency. Similarly, even if a strategy which is strictly dominant in expectation
is subject to arbitrarily high noise, it will always survive with positive probability;
by contrast, such strategies become extinct (a.s.) in the aggregate shocks model of
Fudenberg and Harris (1992).
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That said, the dynamics’ long-term properties change dramatically if players
are less “myopic” and, instead of imitating strategies based on their instantaneous
payoffs, they base their decisions on the cumulative payoffs of their strategies over
time. In this case, we obtain a second-order stochastic replicator equation which
can be seen as a noisy version of the higher order game dynamics of Laraki and
Mertikopoulos (2013). Thanks to this payoff aggregation mechanism, the noise
averages out in the long run and we recover results that are similar to those of
Mertikopoulos and Moustakas (2010): strategies that are dominated in the orig-
inal game become extinct (a.s.) and strict Nash equilibria attract nearby initial
conditions with arbitrarily high probability.
1.1. Paper Outline. The remainder of our paper is structured as follows: in Sec-
tion 2, we present our model and we derive the stochastic replicator dynamics
induced by imitation of success in the presence of noise. Our long-term rationality
analysis begins in Section 3 where we introduce the noise-adjusted game discussed
above and we state our elimination and stability results in terms of this modified
game. In Section 4, we consider the case where players imitate strategies based on
their cumulative payoffs and we show that the adjustment due to noise is no longer
relevant. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss some variants of our core model related
to different noise processes.
1.2. Notational conventions. The real space spanned by a finite set S = {sα}d+1α=1
will be denoted by RS and we will write {es}s∈S for its canonical basis; in a slight
abuse of notation, we will also use α to refer interchangeably to either sα or eα
and we will write δαβ for the Kronecker delta symbols on S. The set ∆(S) of
probability measures on S will be identified with the d-dimensional simplex ∆ =
{x ∈ RS : ∑α xα = 1 and xα ≥ 0} of RS and the relative interior of ∆ will be
denoted by ∆◦; also, the support of p ∈ ∆(S) will be written supp(p) = {α ∈
S : pα > 0}. For simplicity, if {Sk}k∈N is a finite family of finite sets, we use the
shorthand (αk;α−k) for the tuple (. . . , αk−1, αk, αk+1, . . . ) and we write
∑k
α instead
of
∑
α∈Sk
. Unless mentioned otherwise, deterministic processes will be represented
by lowercase letters, while their stochastic counterparts will be denoted by the
corresponding uppercase letter. Finally, we will suppress the dependence of the law
of a process X(t) on its initial condition X(0) = x, and we will write P instead of
Px.
2. The model
In this section, we recall a few preliminaries from the theory of population games
and evolutionary dynamics, and we introduce the stochastic game dynamics under
study.
2.1. Population games. Our main focus will be games played by populations of
nonatomic players. Formally, such games consist of a finite set of player populations
N = {1, . . . , N} (assumed for simplicity to have unit mass), each with a finite set
of pure strategies (or types) Ak = {αk,1, αk,2, . . . }, k ∈ N. During play, each player
chooses a strategy and the state of each population is given by the distribution
xk = (xkα)α∈Ak of players employing each strategy α ∈ Ak. Accordingly, the state
space of the k-th population is the simplex Xk ≡ ∆(Ak) and the state space of the
game is the product X ≡∏k Xk.
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The payoff to a player of population k ∈ N playing α ∈ Ak is determined by
the corresponding payoff function vkα : X → R (assumed Lipschitz).1 Thus, given
a population state x ∈ X, the average payoff to population k will be∑k
α
xkαvkα(x) = 〈vk(x)|x〉 , (2.1)
where vk(x) ≡ (vkα(x))α∈Ak denotes the payoff vector of the k-th population in
the state x ∈ X. Putting all this together, a population game is then defined as a
tuple G ≡ G(N,A, v) of nonatomic player populations k ∈ N, their pure strategies
α ∈ Ak and the associated payoff functions vkα : X→ R.
In this context, we say that a pure strategy α ∈ Ak is dominated by β ∈ Ak if
vkα(x) < vkβ(x) for all x ∈ X, (2.2)
i.e. the payoff of an α-strategist is always inferior to that of a β-strategist. More
generally (and in a slight abuse of terminology), we will say that pk ∈ Xk is domi-
nated by p′k ∈ Xk if
〈vk(x)|pk〉 < 〈vk(x)|p′k〉 for all x ∈ X, (2.3)
i.e. when the average payoff of a small influx of mutants in population k is always
greater when they are distributed according to p′k rather than pk (irrespective of
the incumbent population state x ∈ X).
Finally, we will say that the population state x∗ ∈ X is at Nash equilibrium if
vkα(x
∗) ≥ vkβ(x∗) for all α ∈ supp(x∗k) and for all β ∈ Ak, k ∈ N. (NE)
In particular, if x∗ is pure (in the sense that supp(x∗) is a singleton) and (NE) holds
as a strict inequality for all β /∈ supp(x∗k), x∗ will be called a strict equilibrium.
Remark 2.1. Throughout this paper, we will be suppressing the population index
k ∈ N for simplicity, essentially focusing in the single-population case. This is done
only for notational clarity: all our results apply as stated to the multi-population
model described in detail above.
2.2. Revision protocols. A fundamental evolutionary model in the context of
population games is provided by the notion of a revision protocol. Following Sand-
holm (2010, Chapter 3), it is assumed that each nonatomic player receives an op-
portunity to switch strategies at every ring of an independent Poisson alarm clock,
and this decision is based on the payoffs associated to each strategy and the cur-
rent population state. The players’ revision protocol is thus defined in terms of the
conditional switch rates ραβ ≡ ραβ(v, x) that determine the relative mass dxαβ of
players switching from α to β over an infinitesimal time interval dt:2
dxαβ = xαραβ dt. (2.4)
The population shares xα are then governed by the revision protocol dynamics:
x˙α =
∑
β
xβρβα − xα
∑
β
ραβ , (2.5)
with ραα defined arbitrarily.
1Note that we are considering general payoff functions and not only multilinear (resp. linear)
payoffs arising from asymmetric (resp. symmetric) random matching in finite N-person (resp.
2-person) games. This distinction is important as it allows our model to cover e.g. general traffic
games as in Sandholm (2010).
2In other words, ραβ is the probability of an α-strategist becoming a β-strategist up to nor-
malization by the alarm clocks’ rate.
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In what follows, we will focus on revision protocols of the general “imitative”
form
ραβ(v, x) = xβrαβ(v, x), (2.6)
corresponding to the case where a player imitates the strategy of a uniformly drawn
opponent with probability proportional to the so-called conditional imitation rate
rαβ (assumed Lipschitz). In particular, one of the most widely studied revision
protocols of this type is the “imitation of success” protocol (Weibull, 1995) where
the imitation rate of a given target strategy is proportional to its payoff,3 i.e.
rαβ(v, x) = vβ (2.7)
On account of (2.5), the mean evolutionary dynamics induced by (2.7) take the
form:
x˙α = xα
[
vα(x)−
∑
β
xβvβ(x)
]
, (RD)
which is simply the classical replicator equation of Taylor and Jonker (1978).
The replicator dynamics have attracted significant interest in the literature and
their long-run behavior is relatively well understood. For instance, Akin (1980),
Nachbar (1990) and Samuelson and Zhang (1992) showed that dominated strate-
gies become extinct under (RD), whereas the (multi-population) “folk theorem” of
evolutionary game theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003) states that a) (Lyapunov)
stable states are Nash; b) limits of interior trajectories are Nash; and c) strict Nash
equilibria are asymptotically stable under (RD).
2.3. Payoff shocks and the induced dynamics. Our main goal in this paper
is to investigate the rationality properties of the replicator dynamics in a setting
where the players’ payoffs are subject to exogenous stochastic disturbances. To
model these “payoff shocks”, we assume that the players’ payoffs at time t are of the
form vˆα(t) = vα(x(t)) + ξα(t) for some zero-mean “white noise” process ξα. Then,
in Langevin notation, the replicator dynamics (RD) become:
dXα
dt
= Xα
[
vˆα −
∑
β
Xβ vˆβ
]
= Xα
[
vα(X)−
∑
β
Xβvβ(X)
]
+Xα
[
ξα −
∑
β
Xβξβ
]
, (2.8)
or, in stochastic differential equation (SDE) form:
dXα = Xα
[
vα(X)−
∑
β
Xβvβ(X)
]
dt
+Xα
[
σα(X) dWα −
∑
β
Xβσβ(X) dWβ
]
,
(SRD)
where the diffusion coefficients σα : X→ R (assumed Lipschitz) measure the inten-
sity of the payoff shocks and the Wiener processes Wα are assumed independent.
The stochastic dynamics (SRD) will constitute the main focus of this paper, so
some remarks are in order:
Remark 2.2. With v and σ assumed Lipschitz, it follows that (SRD) admits a unique
(strong) solution X(t) for every initial condition X(0) ∈ X. Moreover, since the
drift and diffusion terms of (SRD) all vanish at the boundary bd(X) of X, standard
3Modulo an additive constant which ensures that ρ is positive but which cancels out when it
comes to the dynamics.
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arguments can be used to show that these solutions exist (a.s.) for all time, and
that X(t) ∈ X◦ for all t ≥ 0 if X(0) ∈ X◦ (Khasminskii, 2012; Øksendal, 2007).
Remark 2.3. The independence assumption for the Wiener processes Wα can be
relaxed without qualitatively affecting our analysis;4 in particular, as we shall see
in the proofs of our results, the rationality properties of (SRD) can be formulated
directly in terms of the quadratic (co)variation of the noise processes Wα. Doing
so however would complicate the relevant expressions considerably, so, for clarity,
we will retain this independence assumption throughout our paper.
Remark 2.4. The deterministic replicator dynamics (RD) are also the governing
dynamics for the “pairwise proportional imitation” revision protocol (Schlag, 1998)
where a revising agent imitates the strategy of a randomly chosen opponent only
if the opponent’s payoff is higher than his own, and he does so with probability
proportional to the payoff difference. Formally, the conditional switch rate ραβ
under this revision protocol is:
ραβ = xβ
[
vβ − vα
]
+
, (2.9)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0} denotes the positive part of x. Accordingly, if the game’s
payoffs at time t are of the perturbed form vˆα(t) = vα(x(t)) + ξα(t) as before, (2.5)
leads to the master stochastic equation:
X˙α =
∑
β
XβXα
[
vˆα − vˆβ
]
+
−Xα
∑
β
Xβ
[
vˆβ − vˆα
]
+
= Xα
∑
β
Xβ
{[
vˆα − vˆβ
]
+
− [vˆβ − vˆα]+} = Xα∑βXβ (vˆα − vˆβ)
= Xα
[
vˆα −
∑
β
Xβ vˆβ
]
, (2.10)
which is simply the stochastic replicator dynamics (2.8). In other words, (SRD)
could also be interpreted as the mean dynamics of a pairwise imitation process with
perturbed payoff comparisons as above.
2.4. Related stochastic models. The replicator dynamics were first introduced
in biology, as a model of frequency-dependent selection. They arise from the geo-
metric population growth equation:
z˙α = zαvα (2.11)
where zα denotes the absolute population size of the α-th genotype of a given
species.5 This biological model was also the starting point of Fudenberg and Har-
ris (1992) who added aggregate payoff shocks to (2.11) based on the geometric
Brownian model:
dZα = Zα [vα dt+ σα dWα] , (2.12)
where the diffusion process σα dWα represents the impact of random, weather-like
effects on the genotype’s fitness (see also Cabrales, 2000; Hofbauer and Imhof, 2009;
4An important special case where it makes sense to consider correlated shocks is if the payoff
functions vα(x) are derived from random matchings in a finite game whose payoff matrix is subject
to stochastic perturbations. This specific disturbance model is discussed in Section 5.
5The replicator equation (RD) is obtained simply by computing the evolution of the frequencies
xα = zα/
∑
β zβ under (2.11).
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Imhof, 2005).6 Itô’s lemma applied to the population shares Xα = Zα/
∑
β Zβ then
yields the replicator dynamics with aggregate shocks:
dXα = Xα
[
vα(X)−
∑
β
Xβvβ(X)
]
dt
+Xα
[
σα dWα −
∑
β
σβXβ dWβ
]
−Xα
[
σ2αXα −
∑
β
σ2βX
2
β
]
dt.
(2.13)
In a repeated game context, the replicator dynamics also arise from a continuous-
time variant of the exponential weight algorithm introduced by Vovk (1990) and
Littlestone and Warmuth (1994) (see also Sorin, 2009). In particular, if players
follow the exponential learning scheme:
dyα = vα(x) dt,
xα =
exp(yα)∑
β exp(yβ)
,
(2.14)
that is, if they play a logit best response to the vector of their cumulative pay-
offs, then the frequencies xα follow (RD).
7 Building on this, Mertikopoulos and
Moustakas (2009, 2010) considered the stochastically perturbed exponential learn-
ing scheme:
dYα = vα(X) dt+ σα(X)dWα,
Xα =
exp(Yα)∑
β exp(Yβ)
,
(2.15)
where the cumulative payoffs are perturbed by the observation noise process σαdWα.
By Itô’s lemma, we then obtain the stochastic replicator dynamics of exponential
learning:
dXα = Xα
[
vα(X)−
∑
β
Xβvβ(X)
]
dt
+Xα
[
σα dWα −
∑
β
σβXβ dWβ
]
+
Xα
2
[
σ2α(1− 2Xα)−
∑
β
σ2βXβ(1− 2Xβ)
]
dt.
(2.16)
Besides their very distinct origins, a key difference between the stochastic repli-
cator dynamics (SRD) and the stochastic models (2.13)/(2.16) is that there is no
Itô correction term in the former. The reason for this is that in (2.13) and (2.16),
the noise affects primarily the evolution of an intermediary variable (the absolute
population sizes Zα and the players’ cumulative payoffs Yα respectively) before be-
ing carried over to the evolution of the strategy shares Xα. By contrast, the payoff
shocks that impact the players’ revision protocol in (SRD) affect the corresponding
strategy shares directly, so there is no intervening Itô correction.
6Khasminskii and Potsepun (2006) also considered a related evolutionary model with
Stratonovich-type perturbations while, more recently, Vlasic (2012) studied the effect of discon-
tinuous semimartingale shocks incurred by catastrophic, earthquake-like events.
7The intermediate variable yα should be thought of as an evaluation of how good the strategy
α is, and the formula for xα as a way of transforming these evaluations into a strategy.
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The pure noise case. To better understand the differences between our model and
previous models of stochastic replicator dynamics, it is useful to consider the case
of pure noise, that is, when the expected payoff of each strategy is equal to one and
the same constant C: vα(x) = C for all α ∈ A and for all x ∈ X.
For simplicity, let us also assume that σα(x) is independent of the state of the
population x. Eq. (2.12) then becomes a simple geometric Brownian motion of the
form:
dZα = Zα [C dt+ σα dWα] , (2.17)
which readily yields Zα(t) = Zα(0) exp
(
(C − σ2α/2)t+ σαWα(t)
)
. The correspond-
ing frequency Xα = Zα/
∑
β Zβ will then be:
Xα(t) =
Xα(0) exp
(− 1
2
σ2αt+ σαWα(t)
)
∑
β Xβ(0) exp
(
− 1
2
σ2βt+ σβWβ(t)
) . (2.18)
If σα 6= 0, the law of large numbers yields − 12σ2αt + σαWα(t) ∼ − 12σ2αt (a.s.).
Therefore, letting σmin = minα∈A σα, it follows from (2.18) that strategy α ∈ A
is eliminated if σα > σmin and survives if σα = σmin (a.s.).
8 In particular, if all
intensities are equal (σα = σmin for all α ∈ A), then all strategies survive and the
share of each strategy oscillates for ever, occasionally taking values arbitrarily close
to 0 and arbitrarily close to 1. On the other hand, under the stochastic replicator
dynamics of exponential learning for the pure noise case, (2.16) readily yields:
Xα(t) =
Xα(0) exp(σαWα(t))∑
β Xβ(0) exp(σβWβ(t))
. (2.19)
Therefore, for any value of the diffusion coefficients σα (and, in particular, even if
some strategies are affected by noise much more than others), all pure strategies
survive.
Our model behaves differently from both (2.13) and (2.16): in the pure noise
case, for any value of the noise coefficients σα (as long as σα > 0 for all α), only
a single strategy survives (a.s.), and strategy α survives with probability equal to
Xα(0). To see this, consider first the model with pure noise and only two strategies,
α and β. Then, letting X(t) = Xα(t) (so Xβ(t) = 1−X(t)), we get:
dX(t) = X(t)(1−X(t)) [σα dWα − σβ dWβ ] = X(t)(1−X(t))σ dW (t), (2.20)
where σ2 = σ2α + σ
2
β and we have used the time-change theorem for martingales
to write σ dW = σα dWα − σβ dWβ for some Wiener process W (t). This diffusion
process can be seen as a continuous-time random walk on [0, 1] with step sizes that
get smaller as X approaches {0, 1}. Thus, at a heuristic level, when X(t) starts
close to X = 1 and takes one step to the left followed by one step to the right (or the
opposite), the walk does not return to its initial position, but will approach 1 (of
course, the same phenomenon occurs near 0). This suggests that the process should
eventually converge to one of the vertices: indeed, letting f(x) = log x(1− x), Itô’s
lemma yields
df(X) = (1−2X)σdW− 1
2
[
(1 −X)2 +X2] σ2dt ≤ (1−2X)σdW− 1
4
σ2dt, (2.21)
so, by Lemma A.1, we get limt→∞ f(X(t)) = 0 (a.s.), that is, limt→∞X(t) ∈ {0, 1}.
8Elimination is obvious; for survival, simply add 1
2
σ2
min
t to the exponents of (2.18) and recall
that any Wiener process has lim suptW (t) > 0 and lim inftW (t) < 0 (a.s.).
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More generally, consider the model with pure noise and n strategies. Then,
computing d[logXα(1 − Xα)] as above, we readily obtain limt→∞Xα(t) ∈ {0, 1}
(a.s.), for every strategy α ∈ A with σα > 0. Since Xα is a martingale, we will have
E[Xα(t)] = Xα(0) for all t ≥ 0,9 so Xα → 1 with probability Xα(0) and Xα(t) → 0
with probability 1−Xα(0).10
The above highlights two important differences between our model and the sto-
chastic replicator dynamics of Fudenberg and Harris (1992). First, in our model,
noise is not detrimental in itself: in the pure noise case, the expected frequency of a
strategy remains constant, irrespective of the noise level; by contrast, in the model
of Fudenberg and Harris (1992), the expected frequency of strategies affected by
strong payoff noise decreases.11 Second, our model behaves in a somewhat more
“unpredictable” way: for instance, in the model of Fudenberg and Harris (1992),
when there are only two strategies with the same expected payoff, and if one of the
strategies is affected by a stronger payoff noise, then it will be eliminated (a.s.); in
our model, we cannot say in advance whether it will be eliminated or not.
3. Long-term rationality analysis
In this section, we investigate the long-run rationality properties of the stochastic
dynamics (SRD); in particular, we focus on the elimination of dominated strategies
and the stability of equilibrium play.
3.1. Elimination of dominated strategies. We begin with the elimination of
dominated strategies. Formally, given a trajectory of play x(t) ∈ X, we say that
a pure strategy α ∈ A becomes extinct along x(t) if xα(t) → 0 as t → ∞. More
generally, following Samuelson and Zhang (1992), we will say that the mixed strat-
egy p ∈ X becomes extinct along x(t) if min{xα(t) : α ∈ supp(p)} → 0 as t → ∞;
otherwise, we say that p survives.
Now, with a fair degree of hindsight, it will be convenient to introduce a modified
game Gσ ≡ Gσ(N,A, vσ) with payoff functions vσα adjusted for noise as follows:
vσα(x) = vα(x)−
1
2
(1− 2xα)σ2α(x). (3.1)
Imhof (2005) introduced a similar modified game to study the long-term conver-
gence and stability properties of the stochastic replicator dynamics with aggregate
shocks (2.13) and showed that strategies that are dominated in this modified game
9We are implicitly assuming here deterministic initial conditions, i.e. X(0) = x (a.s.) for some
x ∈ X.
10If several strategies are unaffected by noise, that is, are such that σα = 0, then their rel-
ative shares remain constant (that is, if α and β are two such strategies, then Xα(t)/Xβ (t) =
Xα(0)/Xβ (0) for all t ≥ 0). It follows from this observation and the above result that, almost
surely, all these strategies are eliminated or all these strategies survive (and only them).
11In the pure noise case of the model of Fudenberg and Harris (1992), what remains constant
is the expected number of individuals playing a strategy. A crucial point here is that this number
may grow to infinity. What happens to strategies affected by large aggregate shocks is that with
small probability, the total number of individuals playing this strategy gets huge, but with a large
probability (going to 1), it gets small (at least compared to the number of individuals playing other
strategies). This can be seen as a gambler’s ruin phenomenon, which explains that even with a
higher expected payoff than others (hence a higher expected subpopulation size), the frequency of
a strategy may go to zero almost surely (see e.g. Robson and Samuelson, 2011, Sec 3.1.1). This
cannot happen in our model since noise is added directly to the frequencies (which are bounded).
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are eliminated (a.s.) – cf. Remark 3.7 below. Our main result concerning the
elimination of dominated strategies under (SRD) is of a similar nature:
Theorem 3.1. Let X(t) be an interior solution orbit of the stochastic replicator
dynamics (SRD). Assume further that p ∈ X is dominated by p′ ∈ X in the modified
game Gσ. Then, p becomes extinct along X(t) (a.s.).
Remark 3.1. As a special case, if the (pure) strategy α ∈ A is dominated by the
(pure) strategy β ∈ A, Theorem 3.1 shows that α becomes extinct under (SRD) as
long as
vβ(x)− vα(x) > 1
2
[
σ2α(x) + σ
2
β(x)
]
for all x ∈ X. (3.2)
In terms of the original game, this condition can be interpreted as saying that α is
dominated by β by a margin no less that 1
2
maxx
(
σ2α(x) + σ
2
β(x)
)
. Put differently,
Theorem 3.1 shows that dominated strategies in the original, unmodified game
become extinct provided that the payoff shocks are mild enough.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Following Cabrales (2000), we will show that p becomes
extinct along X(t) by studying the “cross-entropy” function:
V (x) = DKL(p, x)−DKL(p′, x) =
∑
α
(pα log pα − p′α log p′α)+
∑
α
(p′α−pα) log xα,
(3.3)
where DKL(p, x) =
∑
α pα log(pα/xα) denotes the Kullback–Leibler (KL) diver-
gence of x with respect to p. By a standard argument (Weibull, 1995), p becomes
extinct along X(t) if limt→∞DKL(p,X(t)) = ∞; thus, with DKL(p′, x) ≥ 0, it
suffices to show that limt→∞ V (X(t)) =∞.
To that end, let Yα = logXα so that
dYα =
dXα
Xα
− 1
2
1
X2α
(dXα)
2 , (3.4)
by Itô’s lemma. Then, writing dSα = Xα
[
σα dWα −
∑
β Xβσβ dWβ
]
for the mar-
tingale term of (SRD), we readily obtain:
(dSα)
2
= X2α
[
σα dWα −
∑
β
Xβσβ dWβ
]
·
[
σα dWα −
∑
γ
Xγσγ dWγ
]
= X2α
[
(1− 2Xα)σ2α +
∑
β
σ2βX
2
β
]
dt, (3.5)
where we have used the orthogonality conditions dWβ · dWγ = δβγ dt. By the same
token, we also get (dXα)
2 = (dSα)
2, and hence:
dYα =
(
vα − 〈v|X〉
)
dt− 1
2
[
(1 − 2Xα)σ2α +
∑
β
σ2βX
2
β
]
dt
+ σα dWα −
∑
β
Xβσβ dWβ .
(3.6)
Therefore, after some easy algebra, we obtain:
dV =
∑
α
(p′α − pα) dYα
= 〈v(X)|p′ − p〉 dt
− 1
2
∑
α
(
p′α − pα
)
(1− 2Xα)σ2α(X) dt+
∑
α
(p′α − pα)σα(X) dWα
= 〈vσ(X)|p′ − p〉 dt+
∑
α
(p′α − pα)σα(X) dWα (3.7)
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where we have used the fact that
∑
α (p
′
α − pα) = 0.
Now, since p is dominated by p′ in Gσ, we will have 〈vσ(x)|p′ − p〉 ≥ m for some
positive constant m > 0 and for all x ∈ X. Eq. (4.6) then yields:
V (X(t)) ≥ V (X(0)) +mt+ ξ(t), (3.8)
where ξ denotes the martingale part of (4.6), viz.
ξ(t) =
∑
α
(p′α − pα)
∫ t
0
σα(X(s)) dWα(s). (3.9)
Since the σ(X(t)) is bounded and continuous (a.s.), Lemma A.1 shows that mt +
ξ(t) ∼ mt as t → ∞, so the RHS of (3.8) escapes to ∞ as t → ∞. This implies
limt→∞ V (X(t)) =∞ and our proof is complete. 
Theorem 3.1 is our main result concerning the extinction of dominated strategies
under (SRD) so a few remarks are in order:
Remark 3.2. Theorem 3.1 is analogous to the elimination results of Imhof (2005,
Theorem 3.1) and Cabrales (2000, Prop. 1A) who show that dominated strategies
become extinct under the replicator dynamics with aggregate shocks (2.13) if the
shocks satisfy certain “tameness” requirements. On the other hand, Theorem 3.1
should be contrasted to the corresponding results of Mertikopoulos and Moustakas
(2010) who showed that dominated strategies become extinct under the stochastic
replicator dynamics of exponential learning (2.16) irrespective of the noise level (for
a related elimination result, see also Bravo and Mertikopoulos, 2014). The crucial
qualitative difference here lies in the Itô correction term that appears in the drift
of the stochastic replicator dynamics: the Itô correction in (2.16) is “just right”
with respect to the logarithmic variables Yα = logXα and this is what leads to the
unconditional elimination of dominated strategies. On the other hand, even though
there is no additional drift term in (SRD) except for the one driven by the game’s
payoffs, the logarithmic transformation Yα = logXα incurs an Itô correction which
is reflected in the definition of the modified payoff functions (3.1).
Remark 3.3. A standard induction argument based on the rounds of elimination
of iteratively dominated strategies (see e.g. Cabrales, 2000 or Mertikopoulos and
Moustakas, 2010) can be used to show that the only strategies that survive under
the stochastic replicator dynamics (SRD) must be iteratively undominated in the
modified game Gσ.
Remark 3.4. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Imhof (2005) also establishes an
exponential rate of extinction of dominated strategies under the stochastic repli-
cator dynamics with aggregate shocks (2.13). Specifically, if α ∈ A is dominated,
Imhof (2005) showed that there exist constants A,B > 0 and A′, B′ > 0 such that
Xα(t) = o
(
exp
(
−At+B
√
t log log t
))
(a.s.), (3.10)
and
P [Xα(t) > ε] ≤ 1
2
erfc
[
A′t1/2 +B′ log ε · t−1/2
]
, (3.11)
provided that the noise coefficients of (2.13) satisfy a certain “tameness” condition.
Following the same reasoning, it is possible to establish similar exponential decay
rates for the elimination of dominated strategies under (SRD), but the exact ex-
pressions for the constants in (3.10) and (3.11) are more complicated, so we do not
present them here.
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3.2. Stability analysis of equilibrium play. In this section, our goal will be
to investigate the stability and convergence properties of the stochastic replicator
dynamics (SRD) with respect to equilibrium play. Motivated by a collection of
stability results that is sometimes called the “folk theorem” of evolutionary game
theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003), we will focus on the following three proper-
ties of the deterministic replicator dynamics (RD):
(1) Limits of interior orbits are Nash equilibria.
(2) Lyapunov stable states are Nash equilibria.
(3) Strict Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable under (RD).
Of course, given the stochastic character of the dynamics (SRD), the notions of
Lyapunov and asymptotic stability must be suitably modified. In this SDE context,
we have:
Definition 3.2. Let x∗ ∈ X. We will say that:
(1) x∗ is stochastically Lyapunov stable under (SRD) if, for every ε > 0 and for
every neighborhood U0 of x
∗ in X, there exists a neighborhood U ⊆ U0 of
x∗ such that
P(X(t) ∈ U0 for all t ≥ 0) ≥ 1− ε whenever X(0) ∈ U. (3.12)
(2) x∗ is stochastically asymptotically stable under (SRD) if it is stochastically
stable and attracting: for every ε > 0 and for every neighborhood U0 of x
∗
in X, there exists a neighborhood U ⊆ U0 of x∗ such that
P
(
X(t) ∈ U0 for all t ≥ 0 and lim
t→∞
X(t) = x∗
)
≥ 1− ε whenever X(0) ∈ U.
(3.13)
For (SRD), we have:
Theorem 3.3. Let X(t) be an interior solution orbit of the stochastic replicator
dynamics (SRD) and let x∗ ∈ X.
(1) If P (limt→∞X(t) = x
∗) > 0, then x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the noise-
adjusted game Gσ.
(2) If x∗ is stochastically Lyapunov stable, then it is also a Nash equilibrium of
the noise-adjusted game Gσ.
(3) If x∗ is a strict Nash equilibrium of the noise-adjusted game Gσ, then it is
stochastically asymptotically stable under (SRD).
Remark 3.5. By the nature of the modified payoff functions (3.1), strict equilibria
of the original game G are also strict equilibria of Gσ, so Theorem 3.3 implies
that strict equilibria of G are also stochastically asymptotically stable under the
stochastic dynamics (SRD). The converse does not hold: if the noise coefficients
σα are sufficiently large, (SRD) possesses stochastically asymptotically stable states
that are not Nash equilibria of G. This is consistent with the behavior of (SRD) in
the pure noise case that we discussed in the previous section: if X(t) starts within
ε of a vertex of X and there are no payoff differences, then X(t) converges to this
vertex with probability at least 1− ε.
Remark 3.6. The condition for α to be a strict equilibrium of the modified game is
that
vβ − vα < 1
2
(
σ2α + σ
2
β
)
for all β 6= α, (3.14)
IMITATION DYNAMICS WITH PAYOFF SHOCKS 13
where the payoffs and the noise coefficients are evaluated at the vertex eα of X
(note the similarity with (3.2)). To provide some intuition for this condition,
consider the case of only two pure strategies, α and β, and assume constant
noise coefficients. Letting X(t) = Xβ(t) and proceeding as in (2.20), we get
dX = X(1 − X) [(vβ − vα) dt− σ dW ] where σ2 = σ2α + σ2β and W is a rescaled
Wiener process. Heuristically, a discrete-time counterpart of X(t) is then provided
by the random walk:
X(n+ 1)−X(n) = X(n)(1−X(n))
[
(vβ − vα)δ + σξn
√
δ
]
(3.15)
where ξn ∈ {+1,−1} is a zero-mean Bernoulli process, and the noise term is mul-
tiplied by
√
δ instead of δ because dW · dW = dt. For small X and δ, a simple
computation then shows that, in the event ξn+1 = −ξn, we have:
X(n+ 2)−X(n) = 2δX(n) [vβ − vα − 12σ2]+ o(δ) + o(X(n)). (3.16)
Since σ2 = σ2α + σ
2
β , the bracket is negative (so Xα = 1 − X increases) if and
only if condition (3.14) is satisfied. Thus, (3.14) may be interpreted as saying that
when the discrete-time process X(n) is close to eα and the random noise term
ξn takes two successive steps in opposite direction, then the process ends up even
closer to eα.
12 On the other hand, if the opposite strict inequality holds, then this
interpretation suggests that β should successfully invade a population where most
individuals play α – which, in turn, explains (3.2).
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Contrary to the approach of Hofbauer and Imhof (2009),
we will not employ the stochastic Lyapunov method (see e.g. Khasminskii, 2012)
which requires calculating the infinitesimal generator of (SRD). Instead, motivated
by the recent analysis of Bravo and Mertikopoulos (2014), our proof will rely on
the “dual” variables Yα = logXα that were already used in the proof of Theorem
3.1.
Part 1. We argue by contradiction. Indeed, assume that P (limt→∞X(t) = x
∗) > 0
but that x∗ is not Nash for the noise-adjusted gameGσ, so vσα(x
∗) < vσβ (x
∗) for some
α ∈ supp(x∗), β ∈ A. On that account, let U be a sufficiently small neighborhood
of x∗ in X such that vσβ (x) − vσα(x) ≥ m for some m > 0 and for all x ∈ U . Then,
by (3.6), we get:
dYα − dYβ = [vα − vβ ] dt− 1
2
[
(1 − 2Xα)σ2α − (1− 2Xβ)σ2β
]
dt
+ σα dWα − σβ dWβ ,
(3.17)
so, if X(t) is an interior orbit of (SRD) that converges to x∗, we will have:
dYα − dYβ ≤ −m dt− dξ for all large enough t > 0, (3.18)
where ξ denoting the martingale part of (3.17). Since the diffusion coefficients of
(3.17) are bounded, Lemma A.1 shows that mt+ ξ(t) ∼ mt for large t (a.s.), so
log
Xα(t)
Xβ(t)
≤ log Xα(0)
Xβ(0)
−mt− ξ(t) ∼ −mt→ −∞ (a.s.) (3.19)
as t→∞. This implies that limt→∞Xα(t) = 0, contradicting our original assump-
tion that X(t) stays in a small enough neighborhood of x∗ with positive probability
12Put differently, it’s more probable forX(n) to decrease rather than increase: X(n+2) > X(n)
with probability 1/4 (i.e. if and only if ξn takes two positive steps), while X(n+ 2) < X(n) with
probability 3/4.
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(recall that x∗α > 0); we thus conclude that x
∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the noise-
adjusted game Gσ, as claimed.
Part 2. Assume that x∗ is stochastically Lyapunov stable. Then, every neighbor-
hood U of x∗ admits an interior trajectory X(t) that stays in U for all time with
positive probability. The proof of Part 1 shows that this only possible if x∗ is a
Nash equilibrium of the modified Gσ, so our claim follows.
Part 3. To show that strict Nash equilibria of Gσ are stochastically asymptotically
stable, let x∗ = (α∗1, . . . , α
∗
N ) ∈ X be a strict equilibrium of Gσ. Then, suppressing
the population index k as before, let
Zα = Yα − Yα∗ , (3.20)
so that X(t)→ x∗ if and only if Zα(t) → −∞ for all α ∈ A∗ ≡ A \ {α∗}.13
To proceed, fix some probability threshold ε > 0 and a neighborhood U0 of x
∗
in X. Since x∗ is a strict equilibrium of Gσ, there exists a neighborhood U ⊆ U0 of
x∗ and some m > 0 such that
vσα∗(x)− vσα(x) ≥ m for all x ∈ U and for all α ∈ A∗. (3.21)
Let M > 0 be sufficiently large so that X(t) ∈ U if Zα(t) ≤ −M for all α ∈ A∗;
we will show that if M is chosen suitably (in terms of ε) and Zα(0) < −2M , then
X(t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0 and Zα(t) → −∞ with probability at least 1 − ε, i.e. x∗ is
stochastically asymptotically stable.
To that end, take Zα(0) ≤ −2M in (3.20) and define the first exit time:
τU = inf{t > 0 : X(t) /∈ U}. (3.22)
By applying (3.17), we then get:
dZα = dYα − dYα∗ =
[
vσα − vσα∗
]
dt− dξ, (3.23)
where the martingale term dξ is defined as in (3.17), taking β = α∗. Hence, for all
t ≤ τU , we will have:
Zα(t) = Zα(0) +
∫ t
0
[vσα(X(s))− vσα∗(X(s))] ds− ξ(t) ≤ −2M −mt− ξ(t). (3.24)
By the time-change theorem for martingales (Øksendal, 2007, Cor. 8.5.4), there
exists a standard Wiener process W˜ (t) such that ξ(t) = W˜ (ρ(t)) where ρ = [ξ, ξ]
denotes the quadratic variation of ξ; as such, we will have Zα(t) ≤ −M whenever
W˜ (ρ(t)) ≥ −M −mt. However, with σ Lipschitz over X, we readily get ρ(t) ≤ Kt
for some positive constant K > 0, so it suffices to show that the hitting time
τ0 = inf
{
t > 0 : W˜ (t) = −M −mt/K} (3.25)
is finite with probability not exceeding ε. Indeed, if a trajectory of W˜ (t) has
W˜ (t) ≥ −M −mt/K for all t ≥ 0, we will also have
W˜ (ρ(t)) ≥ −M −mρ(t)/K ≥ −M −mt, (3.26)
so τU is infinite for every trajectory of W˜ with infinite τ0, hence P(τU < +∞) ≤
P(τ0 < +∞). Lemma A.2 then shows that P(τ0 < +∞) = e−2Mm/K , so, if we
take M > −(2m)−1K log ε, we get P(τU = ∞) ≥ 1 − ε. Conditioning on the event
τU = +∞, Lemma A.1 applied to (3.24) yields
Zα(t) ≤ −2M −mt− ξ(t) ∼ −mt→ −∞ (a.s.) (3.27)
13Simply note that Xα∗ =
(
1 +
∑
β∈A∗ exp(Zβ)
)
−1
.
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so X(t)→ x∗ with probability at least 1− ε, as was to be shown. 
Remark 3.7. As mentioned before, Hofbauer and Imhof (2009) state a similar “evo-
lutionary folk theorem” in the context of single-population random matching games
under the stochastic replicator dynamics with aggregate shocks (2.13). In particu-
lar, Hofbauer and Imhof (2009) consider the modified game:
vσα(x) = vα(x)−
1
2
σ2α, (3.28)
where σα denotes the intensity of the aggregate shocks in (2.13), and they show that
strict Nash equilibria of this noise-adjusted game are stochastically asymptotically
stable under (2.13). It is interesting to note that the adjustments (3.1) and (3.28)
do not coincide: the payoff shocks affect the deterministic replicator equation (RD)
in a different way than the aggregate shocks of (2.13). Heuristically, in the model
of Fudenberg and Harris (1992), noise is detrimental because for a given expected
growth rate, noise almost surely lowers the long-term average geometric growth rate
of the total number of individuals playing α by the quantity 1
2
σ2α. In a geometric
growth process, the quantities that matter (the proper fitness measures) are these
long-term geometric growth rates, so the relevant payoffs are those of this modified
game.14 In our model, noise is not detrimental, but if it is strong enough compared
to the deterministic drift, then, with positive probability, it may lead to other
outcomes than the deterministic model. Instead, the assumptions of Theorems 3.1
and 3.3 should be interpreted as guaranteeing that the deterministic drift prevails.
One way to see this is to note that if β strictly dominates α in the original game
and both strategies are affected by the same noise intensity (σ2α = σ
2
β = σ
2), then
β need not dominate α in the modified game defined by (3.1), unless the payoff
margin in the original game is always greater than σ2.
Remark 3.8. It is also worth contrasting Theorem 3.3 to the unconditional conver-
gence and stability results of Mertikopoulos and Moustakas (2010) for the stochas-
tic replicator dynamics of exponential learning (2.16). As in the case of dominated
strategies, the reason for this qualitative difference is the distinct origins of the
perturbation process: the Itô correction in (2.16) is “just right” with respect to the
dual variables Yα = logXα, so a state x
∗ ∈ X is stochastically asymptotically stable
under the (2.16) if and only if it is a strict equilibrium of the original game G.
4. The effect of aggregating payoffs
In this section, we examine the case where players are less “myopic” and, instead
of using revision protocols driven by their instantaneous payoffs, they base their
decisions on the cumulative payoffs of their strategies over time. Formally, focusing
for concreteness on the “imitation of success” revision protocol (2.7), this amounts
to considering conditional switch rates of the form:
ρ˜αβ = xβUβ, (4.1)
where
Uβ(t) =
∫ t
0
vβ(x(s)) ds (4.2)
14In a discrete time setting, if Z(n+ 1) = g(n)Zn and g(n) = ki with probability pi, what we
mean is that the quantity that a.s. governs the long-term growth of Z is not E(g) =
∑
i piki, but
exp(E(ln g)) =
∏
i k
pi
i .
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denotes the cumulative payoff of strategy β up to time t. In this case, (RD) becomes:
x˙α = xα
[
Uα −
∑
β
xβUβ
]
, (4.3)
and, as was shown by Laraki and Mertikopoulos (2013), the evolution of mixed
strategy shares is governed by the (deterministic) second order replicator dynamics:
x¨α = xα
[
vα(x) −
∑
β
xβuβ(x)
]
+ xα
[
x˙2α/x
2
α −
∑
β
x˙2β/xβ
]
. (RD2)
As in the previous section, we are interested in the effects of random payoff shocks
on the dynamics (RD2). If the game’s payoff functions are subject to random shocks
at each instant in time, then these shocks will also be aggregated over time, leading
to the perturbed cumulative payoff process:
Uˆα(t) =
∫ t
0
vα(X(s)) ds+
∫ t
0
σα(X(s)) dWα(s). (4.4)
Since Uˆα is continuous (a.s.), we obtain the stochastic integro-differential dynamics:
X˙α = Xα
[
Uα(t)−
∑
β
Xβ(t)Uβ(t)
]
+Xα
[∫ t
0
σα(X(s)) dWα(s)−
∑
β
∫ t
0
Xβ(s)σβ(X(s)) dWβ(s)
]
,
(4.5)
where, as in (SRD), we assume that the Brownian disturbances Wα(t) are indepen-
dent.
To obtain an autonomous SDE from (4.5), let Vα = X˙α denote the growth rate
of strategy α. Then, differentiating (4.5) yields:
dVα = Xα
[
U˙α −
∑
β
XβU˙β
]
dt (4.6a)
+ Vα
[
Uα −
∑
β
XβUβ
]
dt−Xα
∑
β
UβVβ dt (4.6b)
+ Vα
[∫ t
0
σα(X(s)) dWα(s)−
∑
β
∫ t
0
Xβ(s)σβ(X(s)) dWβ(s)
]
dt (4.6c)
+Xα
[
σα(X) dWα −
∑
β
σβ(X)Xβ dWβ
]
. (4.6d)
By (4.5), the sum of the first term of (4.6b) and (4.6c) is equal to V 2α /Xα. Thus,
using (4.2) we obtain:
dVα = Xα
[
vα(X)−
∑
β
Xβvβ(X)
]
dt+
V 2α
Xα
dt−Xα
∑
β
UβVβ dt
+Xα
[
σα(X) dWα −
∑
β
σβ(X)Xβ dWβ
]
, (4.7)
and, after summing over all α and solving for Xα
∑
β UβVβ dt, we get the second
order SDE system:15
dXα = Vα dt
dVα = Xα
[
vα(X)−
∑
β
xβvβ(X)
]
dt+Xα
[
V 2α /X
2
α −
∑
β
V 2β /Xβ
]
dt (4.8)
+Xα
[
σα(X) dWα −
∑
β
σβ(X)Xβ dWβ
]
.
15Recall that
∑
α dVα = 0 since
∑
αXα = 1.
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By comparing the second order system (4.8) to (RD2), we see that there is no
Itô correction, just as in the first order case.16 By using similar arguments as in
Laraki and Mertikopoulos (2013), it is then possible to show that the system (4.8)
is well-posed, i.e. it admits a unique (strong) solution X(t) for every interior initial
condition X(0) ∈ X◦, V (0) ∈ RA and this solution remains in X◦ for all time.
With this well-posedness result at hand, we begin by showing that (4.8) elimi-
nates strategies that are dominated in the original game G (instead of the modified
game Gσ):
Theorem 4.1. Let X(t) be a solution orbit of the dynamics (4.5) and assume that
α ∈ A is dominated by β ∈ A. Then, α becomes extinct (a.s.).
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, let Yα = logXα. Then, following the same
string of calculations leading to (3.6), we get:17
dYα − dYβ = [Uα − Uβ] dt (4.9a)
+
[∫ t
0
σα(X) dWα −
∫ t
0
σβ(X) dWβ
]
dt (4.9b)
Since α is dominated by β, there exists some positivem > 0 such that vα−vβ ≤ −m,
and hence Uα(t)−Uβ(t) ≤ −mt. Furthermore, with σ bounded and continuous on
X, Lemma A.1 readily yields:
−mt+
[∫ t
0
σα(X) dWα −
∫ t
0
σβ(X) dWβ
]
∼ −mt (4.10)
as t→∞. Accordingly, (4.9) becomes:
dYα − dYβ ≤ −mtdt+ θ(t)dt (4.11)
where the remainder function θ(t) corresponding to the drift term (4.9b) is sublinear
in t. By integrating and applying Lemma A.1 a second time, we then obtain:
Yα(t)− Yβ(t) ≤ Yα(0)− Yβ(0)− 1
2
mt2 +
∫ t
0
θ(s) ds ∼ −1
2
mt2 (a.s.). (4.12)
We infer that limt→∞ Yα(t) = 0 (a.s.), i.e. α becomes extinct along X(t). 
Remark 4.1. In view of Theorem 4.1, we see that the “imitation of long-term suc-
cess” protocol (4.1) provides more robust elimination results than (2.7) in the pres-
ence of payoff shocks: contrary to Theorem 3.1, there are no “small noise” require-
ments in Theorem 4.1.18
Our next result provides the analogue of Theorem 3.3 regarding the stability of
equilibrium play:
Theorem 4.2. Let X(t) be an interior solution orbit of the stochastic dynamics
(4.5) and let x∗ ∈ X. Then:
(1) If P (limt→∞X(t) = x
∗) > 0, x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G.
16The reason however is different: in (SRD), there is no Itô correction because the noise is
added directly to the dynamical system under study; in (4.8), there is no Itô correction because
the noise is integrated over, so Xα is smooth (and, hence, obeys the rules of ordinary calculus).
17Recall that
∫ t
0
σα(X(s))dWα(s) is continuous, so the only Itô correction stems from random
mutations.
18Theorem 4.1 actually applies to mixed dominated strategies as well (even iteratively domi-
nated ones). The proof is a simple adaptation of the pure strategies case, so we omit it.
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Moreover, for every neighborhood U0 of x
∗ and for all ε > 0, we have:
(2) If P(X(t) ∈ U0 for all t ≥ 0) ≥ 1 − ε whenever X(0) ∈ U for some neigh-
borhood U ⊆ U0 of x∗, then x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G.
(3) If x∗ is a strict Nash equilibrium of G, there exists a neighborhood U of x∗
such that:
P
(
X(t) ∈ U0 for all t ≥ 0 and lim
t→∞
X(t) = x∗
)
≥ 1− ε, (4.13)
whenever X(0) ∈ U .
Remark 4.2. Part 1 of Theorem 4.2 is in direct analogy with Part 1 of Theorem 3.3:
the difference is that Theorem 4.2 shows that only Nash equilibria of the original
game G can be ω-limits of interior orbits with positive probability. Put differently,
if x∗ is a strict equilibrium of Gσ but not of G,19 there is zero probability that (4.5)
converges to x∗.
On the other hand, Parts 2 and 3 are not tantamount to stochastic stability (Lya-
punov or asymptotic) under the autonomous SDE system (4.8). The difference here
is that (4.8) is only well-defined in the interior of X◦, so it is not straightforward
how to define the notion of (stochastic) stability for boundary points x∗ ∈ bd(X);
moreover, given that (4.8) is a second order system, stability should be stated in
terms of the problem’s entire phase space, including initial velocities (for a relevant
discussion, see Laraki and Mertikopoulos, 2013). Instead, the stated stability con-
ditions simply reflect the fact that the integro-differential dynamics (4.5) always
start with initial velocity V (0) = 0, so this added complexity is not relevant.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We shadow the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Part 1. Assume that P (limt→∞X(t) = x
∗) > 0 for some x∗ ∈ X. If x∗ is not
a Nash equilibrium of G, we will have vα(x
∗) < vβ(x
∗) for some α ∈ supp(x∗),
β ∈ A. Accordingly, let U be a sufficiently small neighborhood of x∗ in X such that
vβ(x)−vα(x) ≥ m for somem > 0 and for all x ∈ U . Since X(t)→ x∗ with positive
probability, it also follows that P(X(t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0) > 0; hence, arguing as in
(4.12) and conditioning on the positive probability event “X(t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0”,
we get:
Yα(t)− Yβ(t) ∼ −1
2
mt2 (conditionally a.s.). (4.14)
This implies Xα(t) → 0, contradicting our original assumption that X(t) stays in a
small neighborhood of x∗. We infer that x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G, as claimed.
Part 2. Simply note that the stability assumption of Part 2 implies that there exists
a positive measure of interior trajectories X(t) that remain in an arbitrarily small
neighborhood of x∗ with positive probability. The proof then follows as in Part 1.
Part 3. Let Zα = Yα − Yα∗ be defined as in (3.20) and let m > 0 be such that
vα∗(x) − vα(x) ≥ m for all x in some sufficiently small neighborhood of x∗. Also,
let M > 0 be sufficiently large so that X(t) ∈ U if Zα(t) ≤ −M for all α ∈ A∗;
as in the proof of Theorem 3.3, we will show that there is a suitable choice of M
such that Zα(0) < −2M for all α 6= α∗ implies that X(t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0 and
Zα(t)→ −∞ for all α 6= α∗ with probability at least 1− ε.
19Recall here that strict equilibria of G are also strict equilibria of Gσ , but the converse need
not hold.
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Indeed, by setting β = α∗ in (4.9), we obtain:
dZα = [Uα − Uα∗ ] dt+
[∫ t
0
σα(X) dWα −
∫ t
0
σα∗(X) dWα∗
]
dt (4.15)
so, recalling (eq:pay-cum-noise), for all t ≤ τU = inf{t > 0 : X(t) /∈ U}, we will
have:
Zα(t) ≤ −2M − 1
2
mt2 +
∫ t
0
θ(s) ds− ξ(t), (4.16)
where ξ denotes the martingale part of (4.15) and θ(t) is defined as in (4.11).
Now, let W (t) be a Wiener process starting at the origin. We will show that if
M is chosen sufficiently large, then
P
(
M + 1
2
mt2 ≥ ∫ t
0
W (s) ds for all t ≥ 0
)
≥ 1− ε. (4.17)
With a fair degree of hindsight, we note first that 1
4
mt2 + 1
2
M ≥ at2 + bt+ c where
a = 1
4
m, b = 1
2
√
Mm and c = 1
2
M , so it suffices to show that the hitting time
τ = inf{t : ∫ t
0
W (s) ds = at2 + bt + c} is infinite with probability at least 1 − ε.
However, by the mean value theorem, there exists some (random) time τ1 such that:
2aτ1 + b−W (τ1) = 0− c
τ
≤ 0. (4.18)
Since c/τ > 0, the hitting time τ ′ = inf{t > 0 : W (t) = 2at + b} will satisfy
τ ′(ω) < τ(ω) for every trajectory ω of W with τ(ω) < ∞. However, Lemma A.2
gives P[τ ′ <∞] = exp(−2ab), hence:
P(τ <∞) ≤ P(τ ′ <∞) = exp(−2ab) = exp(−Mm/4), (4.19)
i.e. P(τ <∞) can be made arbitrarily small by choosing M large enough. We thus
deduce that ∫ t
0
W (s) ds ≤ 1
2
mt2 +M for all t ≥ 0 (4.20)
with probability no less than 1− ε.
Going back to (4.16), we see that
∫ t
0
θ(s) ds − ξ(t) − 1
2
mt2 remains below M
for all time with probability at least 1 − ε (simply use the probability estimate
(4.17) and argue as in the proof of Theorem 3.3 recalling that the processesWα are
assumed independent). In turn, this shows that P(X(t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0) ≥ 1− ε,
so, conditioning on this last event and letting t→∞ in (4.16), we obtain:
P
(
lim
t→∞
Zα(t) = −∞
∣∣∣X(t) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0) = 1 for all α 6= α∗. (4.21)
We conclude that X(t) remains in U0 and X(t)→ x∗ with probability at least 1−ε,
as was to be shown. 
5. Discussion
In this section, we discuss some points that would have otherwise disrupted the
flow of the main text:
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5.1. Payoff shocks in bimatrix games. Throughout our paper, we have worked
with generic population games, so we have not made any specific assumptions on
the payoff shocks either. On the other hand, if the game’s payoff functions are
obtained from some common underlying structure, then the resulting payoff shocks
may also end up having a likewise specific form.
For instance, consider a basic (symmetric) random matching model where pairs
of players are drawn randomly from a nonatomic population to play a symmetric
two-player game with payoff matrix Vαβ , α, β = 1, . . . , n. In this case, the payoff
to an α-strategist in the population state x ∈ X will be of the form:
vα(x) =
∑
β
Vαβxβ . (5.1)
Thus, if the entries of V are disturbed at each t ≥ 0 by some (otherwise independent)
white noise process ξαβ , the perturbed payoff matrix Vˆαβ = Vαβ + ξαβ will result
in the total payoff shock:
ξα =
∑
β
ξαβxβ . (5.2)
The stochastic dynamics (2.8) thus become:
dXα = Xα
[∑
β
VαβXβ −
∑
β,γ
VβγXβXγ
]
dt
+Xα
[∑
β
σαβXβ dWαβ −
∑
β,γ
σβγXβXγ dWβγ
]
,
(5.3)
where the Wiener processes Wαβ are assumed independent.
To compare (5.3) with the core model (SRD), the same string of calculations as
in the proof of Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 leads to the modified payoff functions:
vσα(x) = vα(x) −
1
2
(1− 2xα)
∑
β
σ2αβx
2
β . (5.4)
It is then trivial to see that Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 still apply with respect to the
modified game Gσ with payoff functions defined as above; however, seeing as (5.4)
is cubic in xα and considering the case of constant noise, these modified payoff
functions no longer correspond to random matching in a modified bimatrix game.
5.2. Stratonovich-type perturbations. Depending on the origins of the payoff
shock process (for instance, if there are nontrivial autocorrelation effects that do
not vanish in the continuous-time regime), the perturbed dynamics (SRD) could
instead be written as a Stratonovich-type SDE (Kuo, 2006):
∂Xα = Xα
[
vα(X)−
∑
β
Xβvβ(X)
]
dt+Xα
[
σα ∂Wα −
∑
β
Xβσβ ∂Wβ
]
, (5.5)
where ∂(·) denotes Stratonovich integration.20 In this case, if Mαβ = Xα(δαβ −
Xβ)σβ denotes the diffusion matrix of (5.5), the Itô equivalent SDE corresponding
to (5.5) will be:
dXα = Xα
[
vα(X)−
∑
β
Xβvβ(X)
]
dt+
1
2
∑
β,γ
∂Mαβ
∂Xγ
Mγβ dt
+Xα
[
σα dWα −
∑
β
Xβσβ dWβ
]
.
(5.6)
20For a general overview of the differences between Itô and Stratonovich integration, see van
Kampen (1981); for a more specific account in the context of stochastic population growth models,
the reader is instead referred to Khasminskii and Potsepun (2006) and Hofbauer and Imhof (2009).
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Then, assuming that the shock coefficients σβ are constant, some algebra yields the
following explicit expression for the Itô correction of (5.6):
1
2
∑
β,γ
∂Mαβ
∂Xγ
Mγβ dt
=
1
2
∑
β,γ
(δαβγ − δαγxβ − δβγxα)σβ ·Xγ (δγβ −Xβ)σβ dt
=
1
2
∑
β,γ
[
δαβγ(1− 2Xβ) + δαγX2β − δβγXα + δβγXαXβ
]
Xγσ
2
β dt
=
1
2
Xα
[
(1− 2Xβ)σ2β −
∑
β
Xβ(1− 2Xβ)σ2β
]
dt. (5.7)
By substituting this correction back to (5.6), we see that the replicator dynam-
ics with Stratonovich shocks (5.5) are equivalent to the (Itô) stochastic replicator
dynamics of exponential learning (2.16). In this context, Mertikopoulos and Mous-
takas (2010) showed that the conclusions of Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 apply directly
to the original, unmodified game G under (2.16), so dominated strategies become
extinct and strict equilibria are stochastically asymptotically stable under (5.5) as
well. Alternatively, this can also be seen directly from the correction term (5.7)
which cancels with that of (3.1).
5.3. Random strategy switches. An alternative source of noise to the players’
evolution under (RD) could come from random masses of players that switch strate-
gies without following an underlying deterministic drift – as opposed to jumps with
a well-defined direction induced by a revision protocol. To model this kind of “mu-
tations”, we posit that the relative mass dXαβ of players switching from α to β over
an infinitesimal time interval dt is governed by the SDE:
dXαβ = Xα (ραβ dt+ dMαβ) , (5.8)
where dMαβ denotes the (conditional) mutation rate from α to β.
To account for randomness, we will assume that Mαβ has unbounded variation
over finite time intervals (contrary to the bounded variation drift term Xαραβ dt).
Moreover, for concreteness, we will focus on the imitative regime where ραβ =
xβrαβ and the mutation processes Mαβ follow a similar imitative pattern, namely
dMαβ = XβdRαβ . The net change in the population of α-strategists will then be∑
β
Xβ dMβα −Xα
∑
β
dMαβ = Xα
∑
β
Xβ dQβα, (5.9)
where dQβα = dRβα − dRαβ describes the net influx of β-strategists in strategy α
per unit population mass. Thus, assuming that the increments dQβα are zero-mean,
we will model Q as an Itô process of the form:
dQαβ = ηαβ(X) dWαβ (5.10)
whereWαβ is an ordinary Wiener process and the diffusion coefficients ηαβ : X→ R
reflect the intensity of the mutation process. In particular, the only assumptions
that we need to make for W and η are that:
dWαβ = −dWβα and ηαβ = ηβα for all α, β ∈ A and for all k ∈ N, (5.11)
so that the net influx from α to β is minus the net influx from β to α; except for
this “conservation of mass” requirement, we will assume that the processes dWαβ
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are otherwise independent. Thus, in the special case of the “imitation of success”
revision protocol (2.7), we obtain the replicator dynamics with random mutations:
dXα = Xα
[
vα(X)−
∑
β
Xβvβ(X)
]
dt+Xα
∑
β 6=α
Xβηβα(X) dWβα. (5.12)
This equation differs from (SRD) in that the martingale term of (SRD) cannot
be recovered from that of (5.12) without violating the symmetry conditions (5.11)
that guarantee that there is no net transfer of mass across any pair of strategies
α, β ∈ A. Nonetheless, by repeating the same analysis as in the case of Theorems
3.1 and 3.3, we obtain the following proposition for the stochastic dynamics (5.12):
Proposition 5.1. Let X(t) be an interior solution orbit of the stochastic dynamics
(5.12) and consider the noise-adjusted game Gη with modified payoff functions:
vηα(x) = vα(x)−
1
2
∑
β 6=α
x2βη
2
βα(x). (5.13)
We then have:
(1) If p ∈ X is dominated in Gη, then it becomes extinct under (5.12).
(2) If P (limt→∞X(t) = x
∗) > 0 for some x∗ ∈ X, then x∗ is a Nash equilibrium
of Gη.
(3) If x∗ ∈ X is stochastically Lyapunov stable, then it is a Nash equilibrium of
G
η.
(4) If x∗ ∈ X is a strict Nash equilibrium of Gη, then it is stochastically asymp-
totically stable under (5.12).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorems 3.1 (for Part 1) and 3.3 (for Parts
2–4), so we omit it. 
Appendix A. Auxiliary results from stochastic analysis
In this appendix, we state and prove two auxiliary results from stochastic analysis
that were used throughout the paper. Lemma A.1 is an asymptotic growth bound
for Wiener processes relying on the law of the iterated logarithm, while Lemma A.2
is a calculation of the probability that a Wiener process starting at the origin hits
the line a + bt in finite time. Both lemmas appear in a similar context in Bravo
and Mertikopoulos (2014); we provide a proof here only for completeness and ease
of reference.
Lemma A.1. Let W (t) = (W1(t), . . . ,Wn(t)), t ≥ 0, be an n-dimensional Wiener
processes and let Z(t) be a bounded, continuous process in Rn. Then:
f(t) +
∫ t
0
Z(s) · dW (s) ∼ f(t) as t→∞ (a.s.), (A.1)
for any function f : [0,∞)→ R such that limt→∞ (t log log t)−1/2 f(t) = +∞.
Proof. Let ξ(t) =
∫ t
0
Z(s) · dW (s) = ∑ni=1 ∫ t0 Zi(s) dWi(s). Then, the quadratic
variation ρ = [ξ, ξ] of ξ satisfies:
d[ξ, ξ] = dξ · dξ =
n∑
i=1
ZiZjδij dt ≤M dt, (A.2)
where M = supt≥0 ‖Z(t)‖2 < +∞ (recall that Z(t) is bounded by assumption).
On the other hand, by the time-change theorem for martingales (Øksendal, 2007,
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Corollary 8.5.4), there exists a Wiener process W˜ (t) such that ξ(t) = W˜ (ρ(t)), and
hence:
f(t) + ξ(t)
f(t)
= 1 +
W˜ (ρ(t))
f(t)
. (A.3)
Obviously, if limt→∞ ρ(t) ≡ ρ(∞) < +∞, W˜ (ρ(∞)) is normally distributed so
W˜ (ρ(t))/f(t) → 0 and there is nothing to show. Otherwise, if limt→∞ ρ(t) = +∞,
the quadratic variation bound (A.2) and the law of the iterated logarithm yield:∣∣W˜ (ρ(t))∣∣
f(t)
≤
∣∣W˜ (ρ(t))∣∣√
2ρ(t) log log ρ(t)
×
√
2Mt log logMt
f(t)
→ 0 as t→∞, (A.4)
and our claim follows. 
Lemma A.2. LetW (t) be a standard one-dimensional Wiener process and consider
the hitting time τa,b = inf{t > 0 : W (t) = a+ bt}, a, b ∈ R. Then:
P (τa,b <∞) = exp(−ab− |ab|). (A.5)
Proof. Let W (t) = W (t) − bt so that τa,b = inf{t > 0 : W (t) = a}. By Girsanov’s
theorem (see e.g. Øksendal, 2007, Chap. 8), there exists a probability measure Q
such that a)W is a Brownian motion with respect to Q; and b) the Radon–Nikodym
derivative of Q with respect to P satisfies
dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣
Ft
= exp
(−b2t/2 + bW (t)) = exp (b2t/2− bW (t)) , (A.6)
where Ft denotes the natural filtration of W (t). We then get
P (τa,b < t) = EP [1(τa,b < t)]
= EQ
[
1(τa,b < t) · exp(−b2t/2− bW (t))
]
= EQ
[
1(τa,b < t) · exp(−b2τa,b/2− bW (τa,b))
]
= exp(−ab)EQ
[
1(τa,b < t) · exp(−b2τa,b/2)
]
, (A.7)
and hence:
P (τa,b <∞) = lim
t→∞
P (τa,b < t)
= lim
t→∞
exp(−ab)EQ
[
1(τa,b < t) · exp(−b2τa,b/2)
]
= exp(−ab)EQ
[
exp(−b2τa,b/2)
]
= exp(−ab− |ab|), (A.8)
where, in the last step, we used the expression E[exp(−λτa)] = exp(−a
√
2λ) for
the Laplace transform of the Brownian hitting time τa = inf{t > 0 : W (t) = a}
(Karatzas and Shreve, 1998). 
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